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I. Introduction
In the past, startup companies in the U.S. followed a predictable path: they raised angel
capital, a few rounds of venture capital, and went public1 within five years.2 Recently there has
been a trend of private3 companies staying private for longer periods of time, without an initial
public offering (“IPO”) or acquisition from a public company. The results have been an increase
in “mature” startups4 and a potential decrease in IPOs.5 Many factors have been cited as
contributing to the problem, such as the rise in online brokers, decimalization, and the passage of
Sarbanes-Oxley.6 Scholars have even written about the role that the changes in technology and
the changing public market dynamics have played into the decrease in IPOs.7 However, recent
regulatory changes have helped drive the trend by increasing availability of private capital to
younger companies, enabling companies to avoid the risks and costs of going public.

Companies that are subject to reporting requirements are referred to as “reporting companies.” If a reporting
company has publicly traded stock, it is referred to as a “public company.”
2
Examining Investor Risks in Capital Raising: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities, Insurance, and
Investment of the Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 88 (2011) (statement of Barry E.
Silbert, Founder and Chief Executive Officer, SecondMarket, Inc.) available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-112shrg74930/pdf/CHRG-112shrg74930.pdf.
3
A non-reporting company whose stock is not publicly traded is referred to as a “private” company.
4
IPO Task Force, Rebuilding the IPO On-Ramp: Putting Emerging Companies and the Job Market Back on the
Road to Growth 6 (2011), https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/rebuilding_the_ipo_on-ramp.pdf (“In addition,
the companies that make it to the public markets are taking twice as long to do so: The median age of a venturebacked company at the time of its IPO has nearly doubled in recent years.”); see Figure 3.
5
Elisabeth de Fontenay, The Deregulation of Private Capital and the Decline of the Public Company, 68 HASTINGS
L.J. 445 (2017) (“From 2001 through 2012, there were an average of only 99 IPOs per year, compared to 310 IPOs
per year between 1980 and 2000. Given that the total number of U.S. startups grew overall during the same period,
the proportion of U.S. firms undergoing an IPO fell even more dramatically.”) (emphasis in original text); see
Figure 2.
6
See Examining Investor Risks in Capital Raising: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities, Insurance, and
Investment of the Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 89-90 (2011) (statement of Barry E.
Silbert, Founder and Chief Executive Officer, SecondMarket, Inc.); see also de Fontenay, supra note 5, at 449
(“information effects of our new securities-law paradigm”).
7
Elizabeth Pollman, Startup Governance, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 155, 209 (2019) (“Scholars have debated the role that
regulatory costs, securities law changes, technology, and public market dynamics may have played in these
developments.”).
1
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II. Public Versus Private Companies
Traditionally, going public with an IPO was seen as the best way to gain access to capital by
reaching a broad range of investors for a relatively low price. However, the passage of multiple
pieces of legislation made IPO expenses astronomical, and many “unicorns”8 have demonstrated
that they can raise capital without an IPO.9 The current primary exit strategy for founders seems
to be selling to a public company. There has been an overall decline in the number of publicly
listed companies since its peak in 1996, as shown by Figure 1 below.10
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A unicorn company is a private company with a valuation of over $1 billion.
See Pollman, supra note 7, at 210.
10
The data is from the World Federation of Exchange Database, available at
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LDOM.NO?locations=US (“Listed domestic companies are those
which have shares listed on an exchange at the end of the year. Investment funds, unit trusts, and companies whose
only business goal is to hold shares of other listed companies, such as holding companies and investment companies,
regardless of their legal status, are excluded. A company with several classes of shares is counted once. Only
companies admitted to listing on the exchange are included.”); see also David Weild & Edward Kim, A Wake-Up
Call for America, Capital Markets Series, Grant Thornton LLP 4 (2009) https://www.sec.gov/comments/26526/265-26-19.pdf.
9
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Companies need capital to invest in growth and expansion plans, to hire employees, to fund
mergers and acquisitions, to finance operations, and to pay existing debt.11

However, the

underlying motivations to go public are not limited to just money. Another motivation to go public
is the perceived legitimacy and prestige in being a publicly traded company. Incidentally, potential
investors may feel more comfortable investing in a company if it is subject to the SEC’s disclosure
requirements. If successful, an IPO tends to send a signal that the company has arrived.12 The
publicity of an IPO has the potential to bring in countless new investors. Going public also brings
stability to the company in the form of a reliable and liquid source of capital. IPOs also create a
new form of currency—publicly traded stock—that could be used to acquire other businesses and
recruit employees.13 A company’s debt-to-equity ratio usually declines after an IPO, making banks
more willing to give loans.
The main factor demotivating companies from going public is, coincidentally, money. The
IPO itself is expensive, but the continuous reporting requirements are subject to a high standard
that makes them even more costly. Smaller companies, especially startups, are at a disadvantage
in bearing these costs compared to their larger counterparts.14 After going public, founders lose a
certain amount of control since they have to answer to shareholders and independent directors on
their Board. This makes the decision-making process for public companies more formal and less
flexible, unlike what is notorious of startup culture. Public companies face more risk to lawsuits,

11

SIFMA Insights: US Equity Capital Formation Primer, An exploration of the IPO process and listings exchanges
5 (November 2018).
12
Renee M. Jones, The Unicorn Governance Trap, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 165, 170 (2017).
13
Id.
14
Caroline Rasmussen, Where have all the public companies gone? CNBC (Oct. 27, 2017),
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/25/where-have-all-the-public-companies-gone.html.
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public scrutiny, and takeover attempts. There has also been changes in the IPO process over the
past few decades that has made it a longer and more demanding process.15
In the past it seemed that the benefits of going public outweighed the costs, making it a
logical step in a startup’s life cycle.16 However, today’s companies do not seem to be seeing the
same value in going public as companies in the past, because it seems that a lot less companies are
choosing IPOs than they used to. The average number of total IPOs for the years 1980 through
2000 was 310, made up by roughly equal percentages of small firms and large firms.17 For the
years 2001 through 2019, the average number of annual IPOs was 110.18 The size of the companies
making IPOs is also noteworthy, since only 28% of the IPOs were conducted by small firms, those
with pre-issue annual sales of less than $50 million.19 The data showing the trends in IPOs show
that IPO trends ebb and flow, as seen in Figure 2.20 The number of IPOs peaked in 1996, the same
year the number of companies publicly listed on a U.S. exchange peaked.21 IPOs hit an all-time
low in 2008 with only 21 IPOs conducted.22

15

Lia Der Marderosian, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, 2017 IPO Report, Harvard Law School Forum
on Corporate Governance (May 25, 2017) https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/05/25/2017-ipo-report/.
16
See Jones, supra note 12, at 171.
17
Xiaohui Gao et al., Where Have All the IPOs Gone?, 48 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1663, 1668 (2013).
18
See Jay R. Ritter, Initial Public Offerings: Updated Statistics 10 (March 18, 2020),
https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/files/IPOs2019Statistics_Mar18_2020.pdf.
19
Gao et al., supra note 17, at 1667.
20
Data is from Jay R. Ritter, Initial Public Offerings: Updated Statistics 10 (March 18, 2020),
https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/files/IPOs2019Statistics_Mar18_2020.pdf.
21
See Figure 1.
22
See Figure 2.
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Another noteworthy trend is the increased median age of companies conducting IPOs, as
evidenced by Figure 3 below.23 Enabling private companies to stay private longer is undoubtedly
one of the reasons for this.
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See Figure 3. Data is from Jay R. Ritter, Initial Public Offerings: Updated Statistics 10 (March 18, 2020),
https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/files/IPOs2019Statistics_Mar18_2020.pdf.
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A major concern about the decline in IPOs is that the United States is missing out on millions
of jobs that would have been created by IPOs. Additionally, a lack of disclosure leaves investors
vulnerable, especially if not accredited investors. This decline may be stifling innovation by
disincentivizing entrepreneurs from pursuing a startup. Companies used to grow up in the public
market,24 but today’s companies are earning most of their value pre-IPO.
III. Securities Regulation Background
The two main federal securities laws, the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, were passed in the midst of the Great Depression. In 1929, the stock market crashed
and public confidence in the securities markets plummeted. In the following years, investors and
banks lost huge sums of money. The consensus was that, for the economy to recover, the public
had to have faith in the markets again. And to restore faith meant providing transparency in the
markets by requiring disclosure. In 1923, only 25% of the firms with securities listed on the New
York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) provided investors with quarterly and annual financial
statements.25 There were multiple federal bills proposed to regulate securities by requiring public
firms to make periodic disclosures, but they were not successful.

A. The Securities Act of 1933
The Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act” or “1933 Act”) was adopted “[t]o provide full
and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and
through the mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof.”26 It requires firms making public

24

Timothy B. Lee, The IPO is dying. Marc Andreessen explains why, VOX (June 26, 2014),
https://www.vox.com/2014/6/26/5837638/the-ipo-is-dying-marc-andreessen-explains-why.
25
Michael D. Guttentag, Patching a Hole in the JOBS Act: How and Why to Rewrite the Rules that Require Firms
to Make Periodic Disclosures, 88 IND. L.J. 151, 162 (2013).
26
Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1933)).
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offerings of securities to follow a certain procedure, including disclosing material information
about the firm and the securities.27 It has two basic objectives: “[t]o require that investors receive
financial and other significant information concerning securities being offered for public sale; and
[t]o prohibit deceit, misrepresentations, and other fraud in the sale of securities.”28
In other words, it regulates the offer and sale of securities by requiring that every offer and
sale of securities be registered with the SEC or qualify for an exemption. The SEC seeks to foster
capital formation through its exemptions of many small offerings by lowering the cost of offering
securities to the public. Section 5 requires that an issuer register any offer or sale of its securities
unless an exemption applies.29 Sections 330 and 431 generally exempt certain types of securities
and transactions in securities, respectively, from the registration requirements of Section 5.
Additionally, Section 28 gives the SEC authority to exempt others if it is in the public interest and
consistent with protection of investors.32 One major limitation of the Securities Act was that it did
not require continual disclosure once the public offering was complete.33

27

Guttentag, supra note 25, at 163.
SEC Website, Fast Answers, Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, https://www.sec.gov/fastanswers/answersregis33htm.html.
29
15 U.S.C. § 77e.
30
15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (“Except as hereinafter expressly provided, the provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to
any of the following classes of securities: (2) Any security issued or guaranteed by the United States…(3) Any note,
draft, bill of exchange, or banker’s acceptance with arises out of a current transaction or the proceeds of which have
been or are to be used for current transactions…(4) Any security issued by a person organized and operated
exclusively for religious, educational, benevolent, fraternal, charitable, or reformatory purposes and not for
pecuniary profit…”).
31
15 U.S.C. § 77d(a) (“The provisions of section 77e of this title shall not apply to—(1) transactions by any person
other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer; (2) transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering; (3)
transactions by a dealer…; (4) brokers’ transactions executed upon customers’ orders on any exchange or in the
over-the-counter market but not the solicitation of such orders; (5) transactions involving offers or sales by an issuer
solely to one or more accredited investors…”).
32
15 U.S.C. § 77z-3 (“The Commission, by rule or regulation, may conditionally or unconditionally exempt any
person, security, or transaction, or any class or classes of persons, securities, or transactions, from any provision or
provisions of this subchapter or of any rule or regulation issued under this subchapter, to the extent that such
exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, and is consistent with the protection of investors.”).
33
Guttentag, supra note 25, at 163.
28
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B. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, also known as “the Exchange Act,” was enacted “[t]o
provide for the regulation of securities exchanges and of over-the-counter markets operating in
interstate and foreign commerce and through the mails, to prevent inequitable and unfair practices
on such exchanges and markets.”34 One of the main goals of the Act was to require certain firms
to make periodic disclosures, rather than the one-time disclosure required by the Securities Act.35
Compared to the Securities Act, which regulates the process of “becoming” public, the Exchange
Act regulates the status of “being” public.36 Section 4(a)37 of the Exchange Act established the
Security Exchange Commission, whose goals are to enforce securities laws, to promote stability
in the markets, and to protect investors.38
A company becomes subject to the continuous reporting requirements of the Exchange Act
in one of three ways, but at the time of its enactment, the only trigger was trading on a national
exchange, such as NYSE or Nasdaq. The Exchange Act targeted companies with securities traded
on a national exchange since “over 80% of the dollar value of trading in equity securities occurred
on a national exchange.”39 Section 12 sets out the registration requirements for securities,
prohibiting “any transaction in any security…on a national securities exchange unless a
registration is effective as to such security for such exchange in accordance with the provisions of

34

Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §78a et seq.).
Guttentag, supra note 25, at 163.
36
Onnig H. Dombalagian, Principles for Publicness, 67 FLA. L. REV. 649, 652 (2015); see also Exchange Act
Registration: Overview, Practical Law Practice Note Overview 7-506-3135 (“An Exchange Act registration is a
single registration of an entire class of securities (debt or equity). This is different from a Securities Act regulation,
in which a company registers a certain number of a class of securities (debt or equity) for a particular public
distribution.”).
37
15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (“There is hereby established a Securities and Exchange Commission (hereinafter referred to
as the “Commission”) to be composed of five commissioners to be appointed by the President by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate…”).
38
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, About the SEC, What We Do
https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html.
39
See S. Rep. No. 379, at 14 (1963).
35
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this title and the rules and regulations thereunder.”40 Registration requires companies to file
quarterly reports, annual reports, and periodic updates when certain material events occur. Since
the Exchange Act’s passage, the content of federal periodic disclosure requirements has evolved,
but the criteria used to decide which firms were required to disclose has rarely been changed.41
C. The 1936 Amendments to the Exchange Act
After the passage of the Exchange Act, legislators were concerned that firms without
securities traded on a national exchange remained unregulated. The 1936 Amendments added a
second trigger to complying with the periodic public reporting requirements of the Exchange Act:
publicly offering securities in compliance with the Securities Act. It added Section 15(d)42 to the
Exchange Act, which required compliance with the continuous reporting requirements of the
Exchange Act “when the aggregate offering price of the securities being registered [pursuant to
Section 5 of the Securities Act], plus the value of the securities of the same class outstanding,
amounts to $2 million or more.”43
D. The 1964 Amendments to the Securities Act
The 1964 amendments to the Securities Act expanded mandatory compliance with
disclosure requirements to firms that had neither offered securities publicly pursuant to the
Securities Act nor listed their securities on a national exchange.44 The Exchange Act, as originally
enacted, did not require companies in the over-the-counter (OTC) markets to register. Prior to the
amendment’s passage, there was a push from national exchanges to force certain companies in

40

15 U.S.C. § 78l(a).
Guttentag, supra note 25, at 164.
42
15 U.S.C. § 78o(d).
43
Guttentag, supra note 25, at 165 (citing S. Rep. No. 379, at 15 (1963)).
44
Guttentag, supra note 25, at 166.
41
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OTC markets to comply with the same mandatory disclosure requirements that their publicly listed
companies had to comply with.45
Former Chairman of the SEC, William Cary, received funds from Congress to conduct
research on how to improve securities regulation, which culminated with the “Report of Special
Study of Securities Markets of the Securities and Exchange Commission” (“Special Study”). The
Special Study concluded that there were companies who had neither offered securities publicly
nor listed securities on a national exchange that should nevertheless be subject to disclosure
requirements.46 At the time of the study, 61% of the dollar volume of equity securities trading in
the U.S. was taking place in over-the-counter markets.47

The study noted that providing

protections for investors in the OTC market would encourage a more healthy development of that
market and eliminate the unfairness of the double standard of regulation.48 The reasons that led
Congress to establish the disclosure, proxy, and insider-trading protections for investors in publicly
listed securities applied equally to the OTC market.49 The Special Study pointed out that the
“keystone of the entire structure of Federal securities legislation is disclosure,”50 and emphasized
the correlation between fraud and lack of disclosure.51 Afterall, issues that are “[r]elatively
unknown, insubstantial, and unseasoned” should be subjected to more disclosure than their public
counterparts.52

45

See Usha R. Rodrigues, The Once and Future Irrelevancy of Section 12(G), U. ILL. L. REV. 1529, 1532 (2015).
Report of Special Study of Securities Markets of the Securities and Exchange Commission, H. Doc. 95 (1963)
[hereinafter “Special Study”], http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/papers/1960/page-2.php.
47
Special Study, Chapter VII at 547.
48
Special Study, Chapter IX at 16.
49
Special Study, Chapter IX at 7.
50
Special Study, Chapter IX at 1.
51
Special Study, Chapter IX at 10.
52
Special Study, Chapter IX at 9.
46
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In determining the criteria of coverage, the Special Study recognized that it needed a
standard that was both reasonably reliable and easily enforceable.53 It wanted to “bring within the
statutory controls those issuers that are sufficiently significant from the point of view of the public
interest to warrant the regulatory burden to be assumed by the Government and the compliance
burden to be imposed on the issuers involved.”54 It surmised that the number of shareholders was
the most direct and simple measure of public-investor interest.55 Although the study found no
relationship between the amount of total assets and the interest in investor protection, it ultimately
had relevance “in defining a limit where burdens may be disproportionate to needs.”56

It

recognized that the amount of assets would be, at best, a secondary criterion.57
The 1964 amendment added Section 12(g)(1), which created a shareholder threshold
triggering disclosure requirements (known as the “12(g) threshold”):58
(1) Every issuer which is engaged in interstate commerce, or in a business affecting
interstate commerce, or whose securities are traded by use of the mails or any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce shall: (A) within one hundred and twenty
days after the last day of its first fiscal year ended after the effective date of this
subsection on which the issuer has total assets exceeding $1,000,000 and a class of
equity security (other than an exempted security) held of record by seven hundred
and fifty or more persons; and (B) within one hundred and twenty days after the
last day of its first fiscal year ended after two years from the effective date of this
subsection on which the issuer has total assets59 exceeding $1,000,000 and a class
of equity security (other than an exempted security) held of record60 by five
hundred or more but less than seven hundred and fifty persons, register such
security by filing with the Commission a registration statement.61

53

Special Study, Chapter IX at 17.
Special Study, Chapter IX at 17.
55
Special Study, Chapter IX at 18.
56
Special Study, Chapter IX at 18.
57
Special Study, Chapter IX at 18.
58
Securities Act Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, § 2, 78 Stat. 565, 567 (1964) (amended 2012).
59
17 C.F.R. § 240.12g5-2 (defining total assets as “the total assets as shown on the issuer’s balance sheet or the
balance sheet of the issuer and its subsidiaries consolidated, whichever is larger”).
60
17 C.F.R. § 240.12g5-1 (determining that “securities shall be deemed to be ‘held of record’ by each person who is
identified as the owner of such securities on records of security holders maintained by or on behalf of the issuer,”
subject to certain exemptions).
61
15 U.S.C. § 78l(g) (emphasis added).
54
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This became the third trigger for mandatory compliance with the periodic disclosures required by
the Exchange Act. The original 12(g) threshold capped total assets at $1 million, but it was
increased to $3 million in 1982,62 and increased again in 1986 to $5 million.63
Although it was not designed to force private companies to go public sooner than they
otherwise would, it had that effect on several companies, such as Google, Facebook, and Apple.64
The 12(g) registration requirement was “aimed at issuers that had sufficiently active trading
markets and public interest and consequently were in need of mandatory disclosure to ensure the
protection of investors.”65 In other words, the purpose was “to impose disclosure on firms that
were already trading over the counter—and thus where, as a practical matter, a public market
already existed.”66
Since the 1964 amendment, a company becomes subject to the continuous reporting
requirements of the Exchange Act in one of three ways: 1) by trading securities on a national
securities exchange;67 2) by issuing equity or debt securities to the public in a registered offering
under the Securities Act;68 or 3) by triggering certain numeric thresholds.69 The first two ways,
listing on a national exchange or conducting a public offering, are quite different than the third
way. Listing on a national exchange or holding a public offering are conscious choices and,

62

System of Classification for Purposes of Exempting Smaller Issuers from Certain Reporting and Other
Requirements, Release No. 34-18647 (April 21, 1982) [47 FR 17046].
63
Reporting by Small Issuers, Release No. 34-23406 (July 14, 1986) [51 FR 25360].
64
William K. Sjostrom, Questioning the 500 Equity Holders Trigger, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 43, 44 (2011).
65
Id. at 45; Rodrigues, supra note 45, at 1530.
66
Rodrigues, supra note 45, at 1532.
67
15 U.S.C. § 78l(a) (“It shall be unlawful for any member, broker, or dealer to effect any transaction in any
security (other than an exempted security) on a national securities exchange unless a registration is effective as to
such security for such exchange in accordance with the provisions of this title and the rules and regulations
thereunder.”).
68
15 U.S.C. § 78o-6.
69
15 U.S.C. § 78l(g).
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therefore, increasingly easy to avoid. Triggering the 12(g) threshold is not something a private
company would elect to do; it can happen inadvertently.
E. The Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act
The notorious decline in IPOs70 became so concerning that Congress sought to pass
legislation that would encourage companies to go public and reverse the downward trend.71 The
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, also called the JOBS Act, was enacted on April 5, 2012.72
It was the consolidation of six earlier bills.73 Its stated purpose was “[t]o increase American job
creation and economic growth by improving access to the public capital markets for emerging
growth companies.”
The JOBS Act relaxes statutory restrictions on launching IPOs via Title I (Reopening
American Capital Markets to Emerging Growth Companies), which created a new category of
companies—emerging growth companies—who would be subject to looser public disclosure
requirements over the first five years of its publicly listed status. The Act amends parts of the
Securities Act and the Exchange Act to allow exemptions from “certain mandatory public
company requirements for this new category of corporate issuers.”74 Title II of the JOBS Act
(Access to Capital for Job Creators) relaxed prior limitations on general solicitation. Title III
established the crowdfunding exemptions. Title IV (Small Company Capital Formation) expanded
the Regulation A exemption. Title V (Private Company Flexibility and Growth) amended the
Section 12(g) threshold trigger and the definition of “held of record.” Title VI (Capital Expansion)
also raised the 12(g) threshold trigger specifically for banks and bank holding companies.

70

See Figure 2.
De Fontenay, supra note 5, at 456.
72
P.L. 112-106.
73
H.R. 2930, H.R. 2940, H.R. 1070, H.R. 2167, H.R. 3606, and H.R. 4088.
74
Rena S. Miller & Gary Shorter, U.S. Initial Public Stock Offerings and the JOBS Act, Congressional Research
Service 7 (Sept. 27, 2012), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42427.pdf.
71

14

IV. Regulatory Changes Enabling Private Companies to Stay Private
In the past decade, there have been numerous regulatory changes aimed at creating jobs,
encouraging IPOs, and helping startups earn capital. The 2012 JOBS Act increased the 12(g)
threshold and amended the definition of “held of record” to exclude employees who are granted
stock options pursuant to employee compensation plans. The JOBS Act also amended Rule 506
of Regulation D to allow for general solicitation, which was previously prohibited. Rule 701(e)
was also amended, changing the trigger for requiring additional disclosures to employee-investors
from $5 million to $10 million.

A. The JOBS Act Increases the Shareholder Threshold and Excludes Employee
Compensation Shares from “Held of Record”
While the JOBS Act was aimed at encouraging U.S. companies to go public to increase
jobs, the Act created new exemptions from securities registration, making it easier to remain
private. Prior to the JOBS Act, a private company with more than $10 million in total assets and
a class of equity security held by 500 or more record holders on the last day of its fiscal year was
required by Section 12(g) of the Exchange Act to register within 120 days. Section 501 of the
JOBS Act75 amended the 12(g) threshold at which a company is required to register under the
Exchange Act, increasing the holders of record threshold to either (1) 2,000 or more persons or (2)
500 or more persons who are not accredited investors.76
Additionally, Section 502 of the JOBS Act amended the definition of “held of record” by
excluding “securities held by persons who received the securities pursuant to an employee

75

Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012).
JOBS Act § 501(A) (“[W]ithin 120 days after the last day of its first fiscal year ended on which the issuer has total
assets exceeding $10,000,000 and a class of equity security (other than an exempted security) held of record by
either— (i) 2,000 persons, or (ii) 500 persons who are not accredited investors (as such term is defined by the
Commission).”).
76
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compensation plan in transactions exempted from the registration requirements of section 5 of the
Securities Act of 1933.”77 Increasing the holders of record threshold from 500 to 2,000 was a big
deal on its own, but excluding employees from that count was a major contributor to companies
staying private longer.
Although the 500 shareholder rule worked well when it was first enacted in 1964, it
eventually began to directly impact a company’s financial decisions. With only 500 total possible
shareholders—including founders, employees, and investors—private companies were fearful of
reaching that threshold. It made companies hesitant to hire new employees and discouraged them
from providing equity-based compensation to employees.78 Equity-based compensation was what
attracted the brightest potential employees to the company, and incentivized employees to make
sure the startup was successful.
By increasing the number of shareholders a private company is allowed to have before
being required to register under the Exchange Act, private companies are less likely to register
and, consequently, go public. Private companies are now able to have many more shareholders,
thus it is unlikely that many, if any, companies will be forced to go public by passing the threshold.
Private companies can give equity-based compensation to more employees without worrying about
triggering 12(g).

77

JOBS Act § 502.
Examining Investor Risks in Capital Raising: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities, Insurance, and
Investment of the Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 92 (2011) (statement of Barry E.
Silbert, Founder and Chief Executive Officer, SecondMarket, Inc.).
78
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B. Rule 506(c) Lifts the Prohibition on General Solicitation
Regulation D was created in 1982 to “provide a unified scheme for exempting certain
capital offerings from registration requirements.”79 Its purpose was to facilitate capital formation,
especially for small businesses. Rule 506 was amended pursuant to Section 201(a)(1) of the JOBS
Act, which directed the SEC to remove the prohibition on general solicitation or general
advertising for securities offerings relying on Rule 506. 80 To implement Section 201(a), paragraph
(c) was added to Rule 506 and the prior Rule 50681 safe harbor was retained at paragraph (b). Now,
Regulation D is comprised of four rules: Rule 504,82 Rule 505,83 Rule 506(b), and Rule 506(c).
Most Regulation D offerings are issued under Rule 506.84
The amended Rule 506(c) permits issuers to use general solicitation85 and general
advertising to offer their securities, provided that the following conditions are met:
•

Rule 50186 (definitions for the terms used in Regulation D)
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Scott Bauguess, Rachita Gullapalli, and Vladimir Ivanov, Capital Raising in the U.S.: An Analysis of the Market
for Unregistered Securities Offerings, 2009-2014, at 8 (2015).
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JOBS Act § 201(a)(1) (“Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Securities and
Exchange Commission shall revise its rules issued in section 230.506 of title 17, Code of Federal Regulations, to
provide that the prohibition against general solicitation or general advertising contained in section 230.502(c) of
such title shall not apply to offers and sales of securities made pursuant to section 230.506, provided that all
purchasers of the securities are accredited investors. Such rules shall require the issuer to take reasonable steps to
verify that purchasers of the securities are accredited investors, using such methods as determined by the
Commission. Section 230.506 of title 17, Code of Federal Regulations, as revised pursuant to this section, shall
continue to be treated as a regulation issued under section 4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 77d(2)).”).
81
17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (allowing a private offering under the Section 4(2) registration exemption of the Securities
Act if certain criteria are met).
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17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (allowing an exemption from registration for some companies when they offer and sell up to
$1 million of their securities within a 12-month period).
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17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (saying a company can offer and sell only up to $5 million of its securities in a 12-month
period, to an unlimited number of accredited investors and up to 35 other investors who do not satisfy the accredited
investor standard).
84
Bauguess et al., supra note 79, at 12.
85
The term is not defined in Regulation D, but 17 C.F.R. §230.502(c) provides examples of general solicitation
including advertisements published in newspapers and magazines, communications broadcast over television and
radio, and seminars where attendees have been invited by general solicitation or general advertising.
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17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (including complying with the 501(a) definition of accredited investor, the 501(c) definition
of aggregate offering price, how to calculate the number of purchasers in 501(c), etc.).
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•

Rule 502(a)87 regarding integration88

•

Rule 502(d)89 specifying limitations on resale

•

Rule 506(d)’s90 bad actor disqualification

•

All purchasers in the offering are accredited investors,91 and

•

The issuer takes reasonable steps to verify purchaser’s accredited investor status.

Rule 506(c) offerings do not have a limit on the number of accredited investors that can invest or
on the amount of money that can be raised from each investor or in total.92
The issuer has taken reasonable steps if it uses either the principles-based method of
verification93 or one of the four non-exclusive methods of verifying that a natural person who
purchases securities in such offering is an accredited investor; provided, however, that the issuer
does not have knowledge that such a person is not an accredited investor. The principles-based
method of verification is an objective determination by the issuer considering the particular facts

17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a) (“All sales that are part of the same Regulation D offering must meet all of the terms and
conditions of Regulation D. Offers and sales that are made more than six months before the start of a Regulation D
offering or are made more than six months after completion of a Regulation D offering will not be considered part of
that Regulation D offering, so long as during those six month periods there are no offers or sales of securities by or
for the issuer that are of the same or a similar class as those offered or sold under Regulation D, other than those
offers or sales of securities under an employee benefit plan as defined in rule 405 under the Act.”).
88
The integration doctrine concerns whether multiple securities transactions should be considered part of the same
offering to determine whether an exemption is available for the entire offering. The SEC has identified five factors
to consider when analyzing the facts and circumstances of the offerings: (1) whether the different offerings are part
of a single plan of financing, (2) whether the offerings involve issuance of the same class of security, (3) whether the
offerings are made at or about the same time, (4) whether the same type of consideration is to be received, and (5)
whether the offerings are made for the same general purpose.
89
17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d) (“Except as provided in §230.504(b)(1), securities acquired in a transaction under
Regulation D shall have the status of securities acquired in a transaction under section 4(a)(2) of the Act and cannot
be resold without registration under the Act or an exemption therefrom. The issuer shall exercise reasonable care to
assure that the purchasers of the securities are not underwriters within the meaning of section 2(a)(11) of the
Act…”).
90
17 C.F.R. § 230.506(d) (disqualifying an offering if the issuer or any other person covered by 506(d) has a
relevant criminal conviction, regulatory or court order or other disqualifying event that occurred since the rule
became effective).
91
17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c)(2)(i).
92
Concept Release on Harmonization of Securities Offering Exemptions, Release No. 33-10649 at 71 (June 18,
2019) [84 Fed. Reg. 30460], https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-06-26/pdf/2019-13255.pdf.
93
Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A
Offerings, 78 Fed. Reg. 44771, 44778 (July 24, 2013).
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and circumstances of each purchaser and transaction. Factors that should be considered are: (1)
the nature of the purchaser and the type of accredited investor that the purchaser claims to be; (2)
the amount and type of information that the issuer has about the purchaser; and (3) the nature of
the offering, such as the manner in which the purchaser was solicited to participate in the offering,
and the terms of the offering, such as minimum investor amount.94
The Rule also provides a non-exclusive list of four methods that would satisfy the
verification requirements.95 First, a purchaser can be an accredited investor based on income if
the purchaser has an individual income in excess of $200,000 in each of the two most recent years,
or joint income with a spouse in excess of $300,000.96 The issuer must review any IRS form that
reports the purchaser’s income for the two most recent years and obtain a written representation
from the purchaser that he or she has a reasonable expectation of reaching aforementioned income
level during the current year.97
Second, a purchaser can qualify as an accredited investor based on net worth if the person’s
individual net worth, or joint net worth with a spouse, exceeds $1,000,000.98 The issuer must
review documentation dated within the prior three months with respect to assets99 and liabilities,100
and obtain a written representation from the purchaser that all liabilities necessary to make a
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Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A
Offerings, supra note 93, at 44778.
95
17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c)(2)(ii).
96
17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(6).
97
17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c)(2)(ii)(A).
98
17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5).
99
Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A
Offerings, supra note 93, at 44781 (“For assets: Bank statements, brokerage statements and other statements of
securities holdings, certificates of deposit, tax assessments and appraisal reports issued by independent third parties
are deemed to be satisfactory.”).
100
Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A
Offerings, supra note 93, at 44781 (“[F]or liabilities: A consumer report (also known as a credit report) from at least
one of the nationwide consumer reporting agencies is required.”).
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determination of net worth have been disclosed.101 The net worth standard generally excludes the
person’s primary residence from the calculation.
Third, an issuer can satisfy the verification requirement by “obtaining a written
confirmation from a registered broker-dealer, an SEC-registered investment adviser, a licensed
attorney, or a certified public accountant that such person or entity has taken reasonable steps to
verify that the purchaser is an accredited investor within the prior three months and has determined
that such purchaser is an accredited investor.”102 Fourth, the issuer is deemed to have satisfied the
verification requirement with respect to a “person who invested in an issuer’s Rule 506(b) offering
as an accredited investor…and remains an investor of the issuer…by obtaining certification by
such person at the time of sale that he or she qualifies as an accredited investor.”103
The purpose of permitting general solicitation was “to boost capital formation through
increased accessibility of certain issuers to accredited investors.”104 Between September 23, 2013
and December 31, 2014, a total of almost $32.5 billion was raised using the new 506(c)
offerings.105 Issuances using the new Rule 506(c) exemption accounted for only 2.1% of the
capital raised pursuant to Rule 506.106 However, Rule 506(c) is used more often than Rules 504
and 505, even among offering sizes that are eligible for Rules 504 and 505.107
Regulation D, and especially Rule 506(c) capital markets, are active avenues for small
business capital formation, as intended by the legislature.108 Generally, issuers of Regulation D
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17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c)(2)(ii)(B).
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offerings are small companies. A large majority of 506(c) issuers were either startup firms or small,
early-stage firms with less than $1 million in revenue.109 Issuers of Regulation D offerings also
tend to be young companies. 74% of Rule 506(c) issuers initiated their offering within two years
of incorporation.110
The prohibition against general solicitation was problematic. It required “that issuers and
intermediaries have a pre-existing relationship with the accredited investor in order to make
offerings available.”111 One of the reasons for the ban on general solicitation was to help prevent
fraud “by making it more difficult for fraudsters to find potential victims or unscrupulous issuers
to condition the market.”112 However, it unnecessarily limited the pool of potential investors,
inhibiting the company’s ability to raise capital.113 Allowing general solicitation means companies
can reach more investors with less effort; and with more investors, companies can raise more
capital without going public.

C. Rule 701(e) Threshold Triggering Additional Disclosures Increased
Rule 701 is an exemption from section 5 of the Securities Act. Rule 701 was adopted by
the SEC in 1988 to allow non-reporting companies to sell securities to their employees without the
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Investment of the Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 93 (2011) (statement of Barry E.
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need to register the offer and sale of such securities under Section 5 of the Securities Act.114 Only
issuers not subject to the reporting requirements of Section 13115 or 15(d)116 of the Exchange Act
are eligible to use Rule 701.117 The SEC thought it would be too much of a burden to require nonreporting companies to incur the expenses and disclosure obligations of public companies when
their sales of securities were to employees.118 The exemption is not available when the true
purpose of the transaction is to raise capital.119
Rule 701 exempts “offers and sales of securities…under a written compensatory benefit
plan…established by the issuer…for the participation of their employees, directors, general
partners…”120 When enacted, Rule 701 had a $5 million aggregate offering price ceiling which
was removed in 1999.121 Currently, the amount of securities sold in reliance of Rule 701 during
any consecutive 12-month period cannot exceed the greatest of the following:
•

$1,000,000;

•

15% of the issuer’s total assets; or

•

15% of the outstanding securities of that class.122

After removing the $5 million ceiling in its 1999 amendment, the SEC was concerned that
this could result in some large securities offerings without any investor (here, employee)
protections.123 Therefore, it decided to implement disclosure requirements if the sale of securities
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during a 12-month period exceeded $5 million. The SEC believed that offerings below $5 million
were not particularly susceptible to abuse. However, if the offerings exceed $5 million, the
company must provide the investors with specific disclosures. An amendment, effective July 23,
2018, increased the threshold at which the issuer must make additional disclosures to investors
under Rule 701(e) from $5 million to $10 million.124 The amendment was mandated by Section
507 of the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act.125 Section 507
was aimed at addressing two major concerns with the existing 701(e) threshold for requiring
additional disclosure.126 The first concern was that the additional disclosure was a financial
encumbrance for companies to compensate employees with the company’s stock.127 The second
concern was that disclosure puts non-reporting companies at risk of disclosing confidential
financial information.128
Today, Rule 701(e) requires the issuer to deliver to investors the following disclosures, if
the aggregate sales price or amount of securities sold during the 12-month period exceeds $10
million:
•

If subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, a
copy of the summary plan description required by ERISA;129 if not subject to
ERISA, a summary of the material terms of the plan;130

•

Information about the risks associated with investment in the securities sold
pursuant to the compensatory benefit plan or compensation contract;131 and
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•

Financial statements required to be furnished by Part F/S of Form 1-A (Regulation
A Offering Statement) under Regulation A (§§230-251 through 230.263). The
financial statements required by this section must be as of a date no more than 180
days before the sale of securities in reliance on this exemption.132

The disclosures above are minimal because the nature of the transaction is for the purpose of
compensating the employee-investor, not raising capital.133 Additionally, when investors are
employees, they undoubtedly have some knowledge about the business and require less disclosure
than a typical investor would require.134
Increasing the threshold amount of sales of securities pursuant to compensatory benefit
plans at which Rule 701(e) requires the issuer to provide additional disclosures to investors has
helped private companies remain private. The financial disclosures required by Rule 701(e) could
be costly and discourage companies, especially startups, from offering and issuing equity-based
compensation. Small startups are unlikely to meet the $10 million threshold, but unicorns might.
However, the issuers that are large enough to go over the $10 million threshold will be able to
provide the required disclosure at an insignificant cost.
Equity-based compensation is an important part of startup culture. It allows the company
to conserve its limited cash by issuing stock options in lieu of a competitive salary. It also
incentivizes employees to work harder to increase the company’s worth and, therefore, the value
of their own stock. Stock options help companies retain employees because most employees
probably would not want to forfeit their unvested stock by quitting. The ability to reward and
retain employees with a company’s securities will give startups one less reason to fail.
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V. Conclusion
The above regulatory changes (increasing the 12(g) threshold, excluding employees from the
“held of record” definition, allowing general solicitation in Rule 506(c) offerings, and increasing
the thresholding of Rule 701(e) triggering disclosure requirements) have undoubtedly made it
easier for private companies to stay private. They have more room to grow without having to turn
away shareholders in anticipation of passing the 12(g) threshold and being “forced” to go public.
They can freely offer employees stock options because they are excluded from the “held of record”
definition. General solicitation allows companies to reach a larger pool of potential investors with
less effort. They do not have to provide employee-investors with any additional disclosures unless
they sell/offer over $10 million worth of equity options in a 12-month period. But the question
remains, is this a good thing?
To the private companies, these regulatory changes allowing them to remain private are most
likely a good thing. They do not have to expend funds to conduct an IPO or to comply with the
periodic reporting requirements. Companies have greater flexibility in timing their IPOs (if at all)
and can wait until they have name recognition, a demand for their shares, financial stability, and
when the market would be most receptive. The founders remain in control of the company, unless
they allow another company to acquire theirs.
The foundation of Federal securities laws is disclosure, and without it, people who do
invest in private companies may be taking on more risk for multiple reasons. First, with no IPO
in sight, management may feel less obligated to conduct business in an honest and fair way, with
less accountability. Second, many of the investors are employees who ideally have knowledge
about the company but may not be as sophisticated as the average accredited investor. Third, the
only way for these investors to liquidate their shares is to trade them on secondary markets.
25

In terms of the general public, we may be missing out on millions of jobs that would have
otherwise been created after companies conducted IPOs. There has been a huge decline in the
number of publicly listed companies, and these regulatory changes may very well be a contributing
factor. There may be less investment opportunities for non-accredited investors, making it more
challenging to diversify portfolios. A lack of regulation and disclosure of private companies tends
to only benefit the private companies.
The above regulatory changes are by no means the only factor contributing to companies
spending longer periods private. It’s easier to raise venture capital than it used to be, the regulatory
burdens going public entails are higher than in the past, and going public is a risk that a lot of
companies don’t want to take. The result of an underperforming IPO would negatively influence
stock price, employee morale, the ability to attract new customers, and the ability to raise capital.
It also may be due to a new generation of entrepreneurs who have different priorities.
Consequently, it may just be one more thing our millennial generation is ruining.
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